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Locating the global financial crisis: a comparative exploration of variegated 
neoliberalisation in four European cities  
 
Abstract: 
This paper looks at the variegated impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and the different 
ways in which local strategic actors imagined and responded to it through a comparative study 
of Barcelona, Brussels, Leeds and Turin. Drawing on Cultural Political Economy, we see crisis 
moments as fertile territory for the analysis of variegation in urban neoliberalisation processes 
as they can break path-dependencies and open up alternatives. Inspired by the comparative turn 
in critical urban studies, our case studies are not offered as representative samples but as dense 
sites to explore the various interpretations and uses of the crisis, particularly at the elite level. 
This analysis suggests considerable variegation in how the crisis was both felt and interpreted 
locally across the four cities. The local elites did not regard this as a crisis of or in their own 
urban growth models but as something external. However, as the global financial crisis 
morphed into national sovereign debt crises and austerity programmes, the experience in each 
city has been relatively similar. The paper concludes by emphasising the continuity function of 
specific local actors through the processes of meaning-making they engage in, something that 
existing work on variegated neoliberalisation has so far overlooked.  
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Cities and the global financial crisis 
This paper is the result of a collaborative project to locate the global financial-economic crisis 
of 2008 and onwards in four European cities. We conduct a comparative case study analysis of 
Barcelona, Brussels, Leeds and Turin, highlighting the variegated urbanisation of the crisis and 
the different ways in which strategic actors imagined and responded to the crisis. We are 
interested in the context-specific trajectories of the global crisis seen from the lens of the city, 
particularly in the ways in which the discursive construction of the global crisis in each urban 
context reflects the specific configuration of urban political economies across Europe. The 
paper takes the global financial crisis as a strategic moment for the study of how urban 
neoliberalisation processes are taking shape in cities, if they have significantly been disrupted, 
challenged, contested, deepened or sharpened. Thus the research is situated within the wider 
field of the study of variegated neoliberalisation. 
Almost a decade after the early signs of the global financial crisis in 2007/8 we know a fair 
amount about how it unravelled at an international and global scale particularly in USA and 
Europe (See for example Blyth, 2013; Duménil and Lévy, 2011; Jessop, 2015; Schäfer and 
Streeck, 2013). There has also been specific research on the urban scale of the crisis. In terms 
of its origins, research has shown the importance of urban accumulation processes (Harvey, 
2012) such as the financialisation of urban development and mortgage markets (Aalbers, 2012) 
in actually generating the global financial crisis. In terms of the impacts of the crisis and 
subsequent austerity measures, we find both case-study research and European-wide analysis. 
The findings are quite conclusive and reverberate at various scales. At a European wide level, 
Parkinson (2012) shows that the gap (measured in GDP terms) between European city capitals 
and second tier cities that had been closing in the boom times is now widening and could get 
even wider if in austerity times policy makers privilege large capital cities. Within cities, the 
European Commission is also worried about the increased spatial segregation and social 
polarisation in European cities after the crisis (EU Commission 2011). Overall, therefore, the 
FRQFOXVLRQLVWKDWWKHUHKDVEHHQ³GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHLPSDFWRIDXVWHULW\PHDVXUHVLQSRRUDQG
most vulnerabOHLQRXUFLWLHV´'RQDOGHWDO, 2014: 4). In the realm of urban governance the 
impact of austerity measures has been devastating for municipal budgets which have suffered 
huge losses (Donald et al, 2014; Meegan et al, 2014) impacting on the reduction of services 
and welfare for the poorest.  
Responses to the crisis at the urban level have not established a rupture with previous phase 
(Oosterlynck and Gonzalez, 2013). Even in a differentiated fashion, we find that local 
authorities are still relying and actively promoting the integration of finance and real estate in 
cities such as Dublin or Leeds (Byrne, 2016; Gonzalez & Oosterlynck, 2014). In Malmo the 
city is trying to build itself out of the crisis with more hotels and shopping centres (Holgersen, 
2015); in Paris risky investment in infrastructure mega-projects is carrying on (Enright, 2014). 
Smart-city strategies have been widely adopted in response to the crisis, but at the same time ± 
as the case-studies of Barcelona and Turin analysed here will underline ± they have been 
pursued relying on pre-existing pro-growth coalitions and economic development patterns 
(March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016; Rossi, 2016). Donald et al (2014: 4) interpret this trend as a 
further re-VFDOLQJRIWKHVWDWHZLWKWKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZ³DXVWHULW\UHJLPHV´ZKLFKRIWHQ³RSHUDWH
RXWVLGHWKHIRUPDOPHFKDQLVPRIJRYHUQPHQW´ 
Therefore we have learnt quite a lot about the causes, impacts and effects of the global financial 
crisis at the urban level. However we find two significant gaps: Previous research has either 
IRFXVHGRQVLQJOHFDVHVWXGLHVRURQDELUG¶VH\HYLHZRIFLWLHVDWD(XURSHDn or global scale 
but there been little analysis to compare the significance of the crisis across various cities. 
Relatedly, there has not been yet a serious attempt to take this crisis moment as an analytical 
entry point to further our understanding on the ways in which variegation develops and takes 
shape at the urban scale, something which has an effect on wider structural processes. Building 
on these gaps our paper makes various contributions. Firstly, we focus on the inner 
geographical workings of the global financial-economic crisis as it is experienced by key local 
decisions makers to study how variegation of governmental rationalities occurs at the scale of 
urban political economies. Crucially, we situate this analysis within the structural position of 
cities in national territories, inter-urban networks and global political-economic structures. 
Secondly, through a comparative approach, we overcome the limits of one case study 
approaches that have been dominating the literature so far. These contributions are situated 
within critical scholarship about how governmental rationalities develop variegated 
geographical forms.  
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we draw from various theoretical and 
methodological debates to propose our own approach which combines cultural political 
economy with a comparative perspective. Next, we present our case study cities and how the 
global financial crisis was narrated and located there. Then we develop a cross-national 
qualitative analysis across the four cities paying attention at how or if variegation takes place 
posing wider questions about the variegation of urban neoliberalisation and how if so this has 
been affected by the global financial crisis.  
 
Enriching variegation studies through comparative cultural political economy 
Over the past decades, neoliberalism has become a powerful explanatory process to understand 
a wide range of transformations in societies. Not surprisingly, due to its conceptual laxity there 
has been a lively debate on its definition and geo-political contours and even an emerging 
backlash against the concept¶V usefulness (Springer, 2012). A useful approach is that taken by 
Brenner, Peck and Theodore who have stressed how neoliberalisation has never been a 
uniform, evenly spread blanket of set ideas that covers all countries and power institutions. 
,QVWHDGUDWKHUWKDQDVVXPLQJQHROLEHUDOLVP¶VSUHVHQFHLQDFRXQWry, region or city, it should be 
DQDO\VHGDVWKH³V\VWHPLFSURGXFWLRQRIJHRLQVWLWXWLRQDOGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ´DURXQGSURFHVVHVRI
market-oriented restructuring of political economies (Brenner et al. 2010: 184). Cities in their 
analysis play a prominent role, as scales of experimentation and variegation of neoliberalism.  
With the advent of the global financial crisis in 2007-08, the discussion has moved to the 
analysis of how, or if, this variegated neoliberalisation process has been questioned, has 
faltered or has been even transcended. Springer (2015) dismisses the early proclamations of 
³HQG RI QHROLEHUDOLVP´ GLVFRXUVH and argues that as neoliberalism is best understood as a 
polymorphic, incomplete, variegated and contradictory unfolding process, it is therefore not 
expected to collapse as a  single entity (see also Peck et al 2010). Instead, we are witnessing a 
series of sometimes disconnected but yet related series of  counter and anti-neoliberalisation 
arguments and resistance, particularly by city-based social movements in the United States and 
Southern Europe, which were most hit by the 2007-8 crisis (Mayer, 2013) 
Against the backdrop of this contradictory scenario characterizing post-recession capitalist 
societies, our analytical focus is on the manifold ways in which processes of neoliberalism are 
deepened and contested, re-oriented and transformed in particular localities through the 
moment of crisis. Crisis moments can be a particular fertile territory for the analysis of 
variegation as they potentially break path dependencies and open up alternatives. Here we are 
inspired by the Cultural Political Economy approach developed by Jessop and Sum (2013) (see 
also Gonzalez, 2006; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Ribera-Fumaz, 2009).  Crucially, this 
perspective requires us to study capitalism, not as a top down, coherent and unidirectional 
smooth force, but as an ontologically complex social relation (Rossi, 2013), which develops a 
socio-spatially variegated territoriality, actualized in particular contexts by local actors 
involved in urban governance and local economic development. Indeed, the institutionalisation 
of particular forms of capital accumulatiRQLV³DQLPSUREDEOHIHDW´DQGDs Jessop reminds us 
³DJHQF\PDWWHUV± DQGLVRIWHQFRQIOLFWXDO´-HVVRS7RFRSHZLWKWKLVFRPSOH[LW\
actors build imaginaries that help them make sense of their concrete realities (Jessop and 
Oosterlynck, 2008) and it is these imaginaries that can be put in question in times of crisis. 
-HVVRSLQSDUWLFXODUKDVDQDO\VHGWKH³QRUWK$WODQWLFILQDQFLDOFULVLV´VWXG\LQJKRZDFWRUVat the 
national and international scales, make sense of the different and contested meanings of the 
crisis and how this sense-making shapes responses to it (Jessop, 2015). He analyses the 
evolutionary process of the crisis construal process paying attention to the co-constitutive 
semiotic and material elements that actors have to deal with at various spatial scales.   
Inspired by JHVVRS¶VZRUNZHDUHLQWHUHVWHGLQDQDO\VLQJKRZORFDODFWRUVLGHQWLI\WKH
origins of the crisis, its spatio-temporal delimitations and if they regard it as a crisis in or of 
their local economic development and governance models. In particular, our study pays more 
attention to the semiotic elements of the crisis construal process and as such our research focus 
is on the urban governance rationalities. By governance rationalities, we understand the 
institutionalised ways in which the local elites coordinate their work and make sense of their 
context which in turn shapes to an extent the local accumulation strategies. Different and 
sometimes competing narratives of the crisis have to be negotiated by urban governance actors. 
This complex process in turn needs to be contextualised within national path dependencies and 
global economic and policy trends. By looking at the local interpretations of the global crisis 
we are able to capture and slice through the multi-scalarity of this process.  This vantage point 
gives us access to analyse if and how the crisis triggers different reactions across different 
places thus establishing patterns and differences in how variegation takes place.   
 As introduced above we develop a comparative analysis of four European cities: Barcelona, 
Brussels, Leeds and Turin. The research was part of a network project that lasted from 2010 to 
2014 in which the authors of this article collectively built a theoretical framework and 
methodology and supported each other with each case study fieldwork. Inspired by the recent 
comparative turn in English-language urban studies (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2016; Ward, 
2010), our research was not designed in a traditional fashion to look exactly at the same 
elements in each of the case studies but to adapt the research questions to what it would make 
sense in each of the cities (Ward, 2010). Thus, for example, we did not systematically compare 
the impact of the crisis across the same economic sectors or compare the same type of policies 
in the four cities as these were not equally relevant for each of them. Overall, we did not aim 
to compare similar cities but in fact to learn from the difference in order to maximise our 
understanding of the process of variegation. A particularly useful technique that we used, when 
possible, was to do our fieldwork in pairs so that each of us worked for a short intense period 
of time in another city taking part in fieldwork. This helped to unhide issues that would be 
DOPRVW LQYLVLEOH WR WKH³ORFDO´ UHVHDUFKHU VXFK DV WKH ORFDO JRYHUQDQFH FXOWXUH WKH UHODWLYH
importance or not of certain political actors and economic processes. Thus we developed a  
³UHODWLRQDO comparison´ as understood by Ward (2008), ZKHUH E\ XVLQJ ³one site to pose 
TXHVWLRQVRIDQRWKHU´5R\FLWHGLQ:DUG8: 408) we avoided taking for granted 
WKHSURFHVVHVXQGHUSLQQLQJHDFKRI WKH FLWLHV¶ WUDMHFWRULHV DQGVFDODULW\  This collaborative 
approach also made us think about the connections between our case study cities and others 
and also with transnational bodies and networks (Reference deleted to preserve anonymity). 
The choice of the four case studies was largely guided by our place of work where we had most 
expertise and it was logistically easy to conduct fieldwork and not according to any pre-set 
categories. The case studies are not meant to be a representative sample of European cities but 
key and dense sites where to explore the various interpretations and impacts of the crisis. In 
WKDW VHQVH ZH FDQ XVH 5RELQVRQ¶V  LGHDV WR UHWURVSHFWLYHO\ GHVFULEH RXU PHWKRG DV
³FRPSRVLQJDEHVSRNHFRPSDULVRQDFURVVDUHSHDWHGLQVWDQFH´ZKLFKLQRXUFDVHZRXOGEHWKH
global financial crisis.  
Our main methods were to interview key informants such as local authority representatives and 
officers, businessmen and women, union leaders, community leaders. Overall we interviewed 
around 50 across the four cities between 2011 and 2015. We also analysed key policy 
documents about the crisis or related to the particular local economic or political situation of 
each of the cities. As each of the authors lived in or near the case studies cities other forms of 
more informal data gathering also took place such as attending policy or academic conferences 
or events about or related to the crisis, following the local media and discussing with other 
academics.  
 
Narrating the crisis across urban Europe 
In this section we move on to our core of the empirical analysis in this paper, namely the diverse 
ways in which these four cities have narrated the crisis. To help the reader locate these cities 
we offer a table with some key indicators of the crisis in each city (See Table 1). We first sketch 
the broad characteristics of each city and look at their pre-crisis growth strategies. Then we 
focus on how the dominant narratives of the crisis vary between these four cities and where the 
local economic and political elites locate the origins and the impacts of the crisis. We also 
analyse briefly any new emerging post-crisis initiatives.  
 
Leeds: the crisis is in here; a resilient economy will save us. 
Leeds is a regional city in the north of England. The strength of its predominantly private 
sector-led economy is moderately high, with its GDP below the EU-28 average (91) (Eurostat, 
2016). Over the last decades the Leeds economy has grown particularly in the financial services 
sector, which accounts for 35% of the GVA of the city (Leeds City Council, 2016). In parallel, 
manufacturing has decreased substantially since the 1980s but not as dramatically as with other 
former industrial Northern English cities still maintaining a healthy advanced manufacturing 
sector. It has therefore a diversified economic base. At the same time it is also a segregated 
city, the most polarised of the Northern English (Schmuecker and Viitanen, 2011), with a 
concentration of deprivation in inner city neighbourhoods (Leeds City Council, 2015).  
The pre-crisis urban development model of Leeds was not solely based on the growth of the 
financial sector mentioned above, but also on a real estate boom centred on the building of 
thousands of city-centre apartments (Gonzalez and Hodkinson, 2014) with, according one 
prominent UHDO HVWDWH DJHQW ZH LQWHUYLHZHG  D ³YDVW PDUNHWLQJ PDFKLQH EHKLQG XQYLDEOH
VFKHPHV´DQGQRUHDOFKHFNVE\WKHORFDODXWKRULW\- LWZDV³DEVROXWHK\VWHULD´ 
In this urban growth context, the advent of the global financial-economic crisis in Leeds came 
abrupt. Its impact was felt immediately right after the collapse of the global finance giant 
Lehman Brothers as described to us by a NH\DFWRULQWKHILQDQFHVHFWRU³,Q$XWXPQKHUH
>«@ LWZDV DOPRVW DV LI WKH HFRQRP\ZHQW LQSDQLFPRGH >«@ZKDWZDVKDppening is that 
[property and corporate] transactions, businesses, deals were stopping mid-track. All relied on 
ILQDQFHVRWKH\MXVWVWRSSHG´FLWHGLQ;;DQG;;5HIHUHQFHGHOHWHGWRSUHVHUYHDQRQ\PLW\
The US Lehman Brothers catastrophe was followed in less than a month by the crisis of the 
merged Halifax and Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Lloyds banks that had to be bailed out by 
the UK government. Halifax Plc (part of HBOS) employed around 10,000 people in the wider 
Leeds City Region, whose jobs were now DWULVNEHFDXVHRISODQQHGFRQVROLGDWLRQRIWKHEDQNV¶
offices. Swiftly, local and regional authorities formed a lobby asking the bank executives to 
keep the region as an important base for the banks (Yorkshire Forward, 2008: 3).  
It is interesting to note how the crisis in Leeds was felt, by the economic and political elites, as 
a sudden external shock reverberating over a frenetic rhythm of global and national bad news 
landing on the city. However, looking in detail, there had been a series of premonitory events 
pointing at the limits of the local economic development strategies. The real estate boom of the 
early 2000s described above started to falter with a stream of projects in 2007 and early 2008 
grinding to a halt or temporarily stalling.  
So even if several interviewees told us that the speculative property development and bank 
lending were unsustainable and unrealistic there was no common forum to discuss this and 
build a narrative. This lack of strategic thinking is generally attributed to Leeds as a city where 
the diversity of the economy, the significance of the private businesses and the often distant 
decision making spheres mean that there is neither a central economic sector nor a strong public 
sector voice. So for example a Professor in Employment and Regional Development in a local 
XQLYHUVLW\VDLG³,WLVQRWD/HHGVVW\OHWRJHWWRJHWKHUDQGGLVFXVVFULVLVEHFDXVHLW¶VDOZD\VD
UHVLOLHQW HFRQRP\ QR QHHG WR JHW WRJHWKHU´ DQG WZR HPSOR\HHV RI JOREDO FRQVXOWDQFLHV
UHPDUNHG³,Q/HHGVWKHUHLVQR macro-SROLF\OLNHLQ0DQFKHVWHU´RU³DJUDQGYLHZRI/HHGVLV
RQO\JRLQJWREHWKHVXPRILQGLYLGXDOSRVLWLRQVRISHRSOHRQ/HHGV´ 
The early beginnings of the crisis in Leeds were momentous and visible because they resonated 
with global events and hit the financial sector which had been heavily promoted; therefore the 
FULVLVZDVYHU\PXFK³LQKHUH´ In the first instance, the city braced itself for very significant 
job losses as predicted by a prestigious national think tank (Larkin and Cooper, 2009). The 
reality, however, is that the job losses were worse in the manufacturing sector; as the crisis 
progressed it was clear across the UK that it was the jobs at the lower end of the value chain in 
manufacturing, construction and retailing more prominent in some cities, which suffered the 
most (Lee et al, 2009). The feeling was, as summed by the head of the Chamber of Commerce 
LQRXULQWHUYLHZ³,W¶VEHHQWKHZRUVWUHFHVVLRQWKDWZHKDYHHYHQNQRZQ%XWLWKDVEHHQZRUVH
HOVHZKHUH´6RDIWHUWKHLQLWLDOshock, there was no attempt by the urban political-economic 
elites to reflect on the local economic development strategy; the crisis was understood as 
generating from elsewhere the Leeds elites stuck with the pre-crisis image of the financial city. 
The fact that the job losses turned out to be significantly below what was predicted helped to 
solidify this narration of the crisis. Therefore by 2009 and especially by 2010 and 2011 the 
economy of the city was already being re-imagined as in recovery and a powerful discourse of 
its resilient and diverse economy took hold among the local elites, national think tanks and 
economic commentators (Gonzalez and Oosterlynck, 2014). This externalisation of the global 
financial was also common at the national UK level with policy makers and politicians arguing 
it was a contagion effect from the US mortgage and banking crisis (Hay, 2013) 
After this first blow, accompanied by a national recession in the economy between 2008 and 
9, a new phase developed. In May 2010, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government was formed with an austerity plan designed to substantially reform the welfare 
state which had direct and long reaching impact in British cities. In Leeds, the local public 
budget has been drastically reduced in a cumulative cut of £214m between 2010 and 2016 
(Halliday, 2016) to the point according to the authority itself ³ZKHUHLWWKUHDWHQVRXUDELOLW\WR
VXSSRUW HYHQ WKH VHUYLFHVZHPXVWSURYLGHE\ ODZ´ /&& ,QSDUDOOHOPDQ\SHRSOH
ZKRVHVRFLDODVVLVWDQFHLVEHLQJUHGXFHGDUHVWUXJJOLQJ³WROLYHDIXOILOOHGKHDOWK\DQGSRYHUW\
free life as a result of benefit chDQJHV´$GYLFH/HHGVBetween 2010 and 2014 this 
translated into the closures of seven residential homes, 12 day centres, 14 libraries, two leisure 
centres, two community centres, a one-stop centre, and three hostels (Metcalf, 2014) . Despite 
these very negative impacts for residents, the public narrative is that of a city that has bounced 
back after the crisis with a resilient economy and a quiet resentment about the national austerity 
programme.  
The public sector cuts have led to a reconceptualization of what a local government is and can 
GRZLWK/HHGVSRVLWLRQLQJLWVHOIDVD³FLYLFHQWUHSUHQHXU´In an interview, this was defined by 
WKHFKLHIH[HFXWLYHRI/HHGV&LW\&RXQFLODV³ZHKDYHWR>«@PDNHORFDOJRYHUQPHQWPRUH
business-like more commercial because that is what we have to do with the cuts, to become 
more efficient, more IRFXVHG´Examples of this civic entrepreneurialism have been hosting 
sporting events in the city, facilitating private retail developments, delivering a new events 
arena and supporting social enterprises as well as building more homes (Gonzalez and 
Oosterlynck, 2014)  
The narration of the crisis in Leeds evolved considerably with time and changed in spatial 
focus. While the initial impact was focused on the bursting of the real estate boom and the 
financial institution both lRFDWHGLQWKHFLW\FHQWUHWKHµVRFLDOLVDWLRQ¶ of the crisis with austerity 
moved to the deprived neighbourhoods and became less visible in the public discourse. The 
city is represented as having weathered the crisis because of its diverse and resilient economy 
with little rethinking of its economic growth pathways. As other cities in the UK (Fuller and 
West, 2016) the austerity discourse has gripped the logics of the local authority displacing 
critiques and contestation. 
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
%DUFHORQDµ$JDLQVWWKHFULVLVPRUH%DUFHORQD¶ 
Barcelona is the second biggest city in Spain with a population of 1,6m (3,2m within the 
metropolitan area). It is classified as one of the most global cities in the world by the GaWc 
(2012). Its economy has been increasingly turning on to tourism, with 8,3 million tourists 
staying in hotels in the city in 2015 (46,8% more than in 2005; BCC, 2016), logistics and 
business services (serving a metropolitan region specialised in the car, pharmaceutical and 
agro-food industry).  
The city is recognised internationally for having hosted the Olympic Games in 1992 and using 
them to regenerate large parts of the city ± VRPHWKLQJZLGHO\NQRZQDVWKH³%DUFHORQDPRGHO´
By 2000s the µ%DUFHORQDPRGHO¶KHDYLO\EDVHGRQWKHSURGXFWLRQRISXEOLFVSDFHDQGSODFH
promotion, shifted towards attracting knowledge-intensive businesses to make Barcelona 
competitive in these industries and smart technologies (March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2016). 
In tKLVVFHQDULRLQ%DUFHORQDWKHFULVLVZDVQDUUDWHGDVµRXWWKHUH¶7KHSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLF
elites in Barcelona interpreted the global financial-economic crisis as the failure of the Spanish 
construction-led growth strategy which had predominated in the early 2000s. Indeed, the 
collapse of the Spanish economy and its model of growth in 20089 was alongside Greece and 
Ireland the biggest one in Europe. The local elites located this crisis at the national scale, 
GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJLWIURPWKH³%DUFHORQDPRGHO´ The interpretation of the crisis in Barcelona has 
therefore been pre-dominantly driven by an exogenous logic. This argument is encapsulated in 
WKHWLWOHRIWKHDQQXDOSXEOLFFRQIHUHQFHE\WKH0D\RUµDJDLQVWWKHFULVLVPRUH%DUFHORQD¶
(Hereu, 2009). This slogan signals two important issues regarding the location of the crisis and 
post-crisis in the city. Firstly, it reflects a consensus among policy makers that the city-region 
is the privileged scale of action for economic competitiveness and wellbeing. For example, this 
was publically expressed by Anton Costas, Professor at the University of Barcelona and 
Director of the Círculo de Economía (a local elitHV¶WKLQNWDQNDW WKHCrisis, the Debate of 
Barcelona talk held in 2011³XQWLOQRZZHEHOLHYHGit was the countries and not the cities that 
were important. Today, that we have good metropolitan statistics, we can see that when a 
FRXQWU\JRHVZHOOLWLVEHFDXVHWKHUH¶VRQHRUWZRELJFLWLHVWKDWSXOO forward´ 
Secondly, the slogan also asserts that Barcelona is moving into the right direction. The 
Barcelona economic model generates a big consensus amongst the economic and cross-party 
politics and beyond.i This consensus has been built by involving a broad base of stakeholders 
both from the public and SULYDWH VHFWRU LQ VHWWLQJ WKH FLW\¶V HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW SROLF\
priorities. For example, the strategy for a shift towards a knowledge-based economy, and in 
particular Smart City strategies, has been set at a city-regional scale not only metropolitan city 
councils but also the provincial and regional governments, as well as business associations, 
unions and other local economic and cultural institutions. And fundamentally, through the 
Metropolitan Strategic Plan of Barcelona (PEMB by its Catalan acronym; funded in 1988) and 
the Industrial Agreement of the Metropolitan Region (Pacte industrial, funded in 1997) ii. They 
are both private non-profit institutions led by local and metropolitan authorities that frame and 
coordinate economic strategies.  Thus,all elite actors are represented within those institutions, 
making it less vulnerable to changes in power.  
Indeed, our interviewees recognised that the unprecedented victory of aright-wing nationalist 
city Mayor in 2011 did not imply a change of strategy or discourse. This was expressed by a 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIDQHLJKERXUKRRGDVVRFLDWLRQ³7KH\DUHQRWFKDOOHQJLQJWKH%DUFHORQDRIWKH
>SUHYLRXV@VRFLDOLVWJRYHUQPHQW´UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIQHLJKERXUKRRGDVVRFLDWLRQ,IDQ\WKLQJWKH
change of mayor represented a deepening of the model with a move  towards the inclusion of 
more private sector actors leading the economic development strategyiii. Thus, changes in the 
political colour of the local government up until 2015 have not necessarily changed the 
diagnostic of the crisis and the post-crisis scenarios for the city. The emphasis is therefore on 
the added value cities have to offer to post-recession pathways. The new local government in 
2011, building on the previous narrative of the knowledge-based-economy expanded it to a 
Smart City strategy (March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016). 
To fully understand the narration of the crisis in Barcelona we need to locate it within another 
meta-narrative that has been constructed at the regional level in response to the crisis: the case 
for Catalan independence. Based on a similar diagnosis of the collapse of the Spanish state, the 
movement for the independence of Catalonia has grown from representing less of 20% of 
citizens to almost 50% since the start of the crisis (Charnock et al 2014). Interestingly this 
independentism has been easily detached from the strategic vision of the city by the local elites, 
as the Smart City is seen as the way forward (March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016). iv  
Finally, we need to also analyse the counter-hegemonic narratives of the crisis which in 
Barcelona have been particularly strong at an international scale and have influenced the most 
recent change in the local government. These narratives have directly questioned the 
interpretation that the 2008 crisis originated µRXW WKHUH¶ and had nothing to do with the 
µ%DUFHORQDPRGHO¶7KHGHHSLPSDFWRIWKHFULVLVLQWHUPVRIGHWHULRUDWLRQRIOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQV
evictions, unemployment, etc., erupted in May 15 2011 in cities across Spain including 
Barcelona. The rise of the Indignados movement, between 2011 and 2014 was a moment, 
amongst many other things, of re-politisation of local society. It was not only a time for protest 
and resistance for grassroots organizational learning and construction of alternatives (Martínez 
2015). Indeed, this led to a new electoral platform of urban activists and left-wing politicians 
under the name µGuanyem Barcelona¶ /HW¶V ZLQ %DUFHORQD ZKLFK ZRQ WKH 0D\ 
municipal elections with a 25% of the vote. As a result, Ada Colau, the former leader of the 
Spanish anti-housing eviction movement, became the new mayor of Barcelona. µGuanyem 
Barcelona¶ was the kick off of several citizens-led platforms that won key city councils such 
as Madrid, Valencia, Santiago de Compostela, Zaragoza, Cadiz. The narrative was not anymore 
the crisis LVµout therH¶ but it is endogenously created and profited from:  
Taking advantage of the economic crisis, economic powers have launched an open 
offensive against the rights and social conquests of the majority of the popXODWLRQ«
:H FDQ¶W DIIRUG DQRWKHU LQVWLWXWLRQDO EORFNDGH IURP DERYH WKDW OHDYHV XV ZLWKRXW D
future. We need to strengthen, more than ever, the social fabric and spaces for citizens 
to self-organize. But the time has also come to take back the institutions and put them 
at the service of the majority and of the common good (Guanyem Barcelona, 2014: 
online).  
To conclude, in Barcelona the crisis was initially constructed as external to the city, as a result 
of the collapse of the Spanish economy and nation-state. In this scenario, Barcelona, with sound 
fiscal budgets and thriving on tourism and the knowledge-based economy, presented itself as 
a solution to the crisis. The crisis thus offered a discursive opportunity to reassert the role of 
Barcelona as a model city and the need for an independent Catalonia as a solution to the 
deficiencies of the Spanish national state. However, activist and urban movement counter-
hegemonic interpretations that locate the crisis within the urban speculative growth model 
eventually broke through arguing that the solution to the crisis is indeed more Barcelona but a 
Barcelona from below, responsive to the needs of city dwellers being dispossessed of their 
social rights and place of living. 
 
Brussels: crisis? which one?  
Brussels is the capital city of Belgium and located centrally in Western Europe, recognised as 
D³YHU\LPSRUWDQWZRUOGFLW\´*D:& Its regional economy is the third strongest of 
Europe, with a GDP per capita that is more than double of the EU-28 average in 2014 (Eurostat, 
2016). As the national, regional as well as the de facto EU capital, it houses an important and 
also international public sector and it is strongly dominated by service industries. The pre-crisis 
model of urban economic development reflects this economic configuration, driven by the 
combination of the (inter)national public service sector and private service growth. In 2012, 
12% of the added value was created in the public sector, with business services, rental and real 
estate being responsible for 24% and financial services for 18%. Despite the thriving urban 
economy, unemployment is remarkably high at more than 17% in 2015, one of the highest 
This is due to the spatial mismatch between the high education levels generally required for a 
job and the relatively low educational level of many inhabitants, often of a migrant background, 
who have suffered a long term unemployment crisis (Kesteloot, 1994). This spatial mismatch 
is well-known, but effective strategies to counter this are hampered by the highly fragmented 
governance system with 19 municipal governments and bi-communitarian governance 
arrangements deriving from its status as capital of a bilingual national state. Although the socio-
economic and demographic dynamics in Brussels are strongly shaped by its world city status 
and partially disconnected from the national demographic and socio-economic dynamics, in 
political terms Brussels remains embedded in the Belgian national governance framework. As 
we will see later on, this generates structural selectivities that shape how the crisis is narrated 
in Brussels.Although the large public sector acted as a buffer in Brussels, the global financial-
economic crisis still generated significant impact. In 2008, the industrial production index 
decreased by 15% and unemployment rose by 10.8% between September 2008 and 2009, 
especially amongst young people. Comparatively with other western European cities, the 
impact on the Brussels real estate market has been rather limited (Fédération Royale du 
Notariat belge, 2010), due to the large presence of the large public sector.  
'HVSLWHWKLVUHDOLPSDFWRIWKHFULVLVOLPLWHGµGLVFRXUVH¶ZDVSURGXFHGRQWKHFULVLVLQBrusselsv. 
The crisis generated little debate in the BCR parliamentvi. No special policy reports were 
produced, let alone new policy narratives and big strategies launched to counter the crisis, 
neither by policy-makers, nor by civil society organisations. The few policy interventions that 
were developed in explicit response to the global financial-economic crisis were limited in 
scope and/or rather conventional in nature (i.e. intensification of pre-existing measures): 
improving access to credit for companies in Brussels (Bruzz, 2009), BCR loans to 
municipalities to cope with the impact of the collapse of the Gemeentelijke Holding on the 
municipal budgets (see below) (DS, 2011) and increased financial support of municipalities for 
the local public welfare centres (Brussel Nieuws, 2011). This observation oQWKHODFNRIµFULVLV
GLVFRXUVHV¶ZDVFRQILUPHGE\VHYHUDOLQWHUYLHZHHV: A board member of local public welfare 
centre recalled that ³WKHUH ZDV QR ELJ GHEDWH RQ WKH FULVLV´. A Trade Union representative 
remarked that ³the crisis does not change employment SROLF\´ and ³the Brussels 
unemployment problem has nothing to do with the crisis, but the crisis amplifies [it]´. And 
according to a public sector expert of local public welfare centres  ³ZHFDQQRWGRPXFKEXW
XQGHUJRWKHFULVLV´³\RXQHHGWRFRQQHFWHFRQomic crisis with [pre-existing, authors@µDV\OXP
FULVLV¶DQGKRPHOHVVQHVVFULVLV´.  
The global financial-economic crisis was hence not seized upon as a discursive opportunity to 
challenge the existing urban development trajectory, but further amplified a long perceived 
crisis situation. The sense of crisis emerging from the global financial-economic crisis was 
absorbed by a set of long lasting structural crises that find their roots in the trajectory of 
%UXVVHOVDVDµGLVPDO¶SROLWLFDOZRUOGFLW\DQGWKDWPake the global financial-economic crisis 
look like a kind of conjunctural occurrence (Oosterlynck, 2012). In our research, all 
interviewees ± in one way or another ± linked the global financial-economic crisis to other 
crises such as the asylum seekers crisisvii, the crisis of long-term unemployment and the crisis 
of the municipal budget. Hence, the phrase that most aptly capture how the crisis has been 
QDUUDWHGLQ%UXVVHOVLVµWKHFULVLVZKLFKFULVLV"¶ 
We will illustrate this with one example namely the threat to municipal budgets due to the 
ILQDQFLDOSUREOHPVRI*HPHHQWHOLMNH+ROGLQJ*HPHHQWHNUHGLHWOLWHUDOO\µ0XQLFLSDO&UHGLW¶
was established as a public credit company in 1860 owned by Belgian municipalities and acting 
as its banker. From the early 1990s onwards, it pursued an aggressive internationalisation 
strategy, which led to a merger with Crédit Local de France in 1996, renaming itself Dexiaviii. 
The participation in Dexia delivered a steady stream of dividends to the municipalities, which 
many needed to keep their budget in balance. In 2000 it acquired Financial Security Assurance 
)6$LQWKH86EHFRPLQJWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHSURYLGHUIRUWKHSXEOLFVHFWRU
But this move exposed Dexia badly to the collapse of the US real estate market to the point the 
Belgian governments had to intervene to keep the bank afloat. This concomitantly led to 
liquidity problems for Gemeentelijke Holding (GH), which was abolished. The Brussels 
municipalities thus lost the yearly stream of dividends and part of its participation in a loan 
extended to Dexia in 2008 to keep the bank afloat.  
Although several politicians referred to the roots of the crisis in the liberalisation of the banking 
sector and aggressive international expansion of Dexia bank, the political debate on the 
abolishment of GH quickly dissolved in the ongoing and long term concerns about the weak 
budgetary situation of many municipalities in Brussels. The solution for the financial impact 
of the GH abolishment followed the same direction to what had been engineered for the 
µVWUXFWXUDOXQGHUIXQGLQJ¶RIWKHPXQLFLSDOLWLHV7KHSURSRVLWLRQZDVQRWWRUDLVHWKHµDGGLWLRQDO
LQFRPHWD[¶DOUHDG\WKHKLJKHVWLQ%HOJLXPRUODQGWD[HVZKLFKZRXOGPDNH%UXVVHOVOHVV
attractive, but financial support of BCR to the municipalities and extra means through the 
federal re-financing of Region (BCR Government declaration 2009; Brussels Hoofdstedelijk 
Gewest Integraal verslag, Commissie voor de Financiën, zitting 24 Oktober 2011). When asked 
about the impact of the abolishment of GH on municipal budgets, the municipal budget expert 
of the association of the BCR municipalities (VSGB-AVCB) responded with a long-winded 
and detailed historical account LQZKLFKKHSUHVHQWHG WKHµbudgetary crisis¶QRWDVSDUWRID 
financial globalisation narrative, but as a consequence of a historical imbalance in the complex 
Belgian governance system. He traced it back to what he claimed was an unfair and substantial 
decrease in the share of the BCR municipalities in the regionalized Municipality Fund in 1974 
± from 17% before to 9,5% after regionalization (Interview with R. Petit). This widely shared 
sense of a protracted - and hence normalized - sense of budgetary crisis is regularly fed by 
recurring new reports on the steady overall impoverishment of the Brussels population. 
Between 1999 and 2013 the average income in the Brussels Capital Region rose only by 18% 
compared to 31% for the average income in Belgium, which is now 14% higher than in 
Brusselsix. This results in an erosion of the local tax base that is 22% lower than the Belgian 
average (2013) (Observatorium voor Gezondheid en Welzijn Brussel, 2016: 15), which is a 
complete reversal of the situation during the post-war decades (VSGB - Verslag over de 
financiën van de Brusselse gemeenten 2002-2011). There hence was already a strong and 
protracted sense of budgetary crisis, which ± despite being rooted in its global city status ± is 
URXWLQHO\ QDUUDWHG DV DQ µLQWHUQDO¶ %HOJLDQ LVVXH UHODWHG WR D presumably unfair budgetary 
redistributive mechanisms within the Belgian governance system. The local impact of the 
financial crisis thus served mainly to highlight the budgetary vulnerability of the Brussels 
municipalities that resulted from this, rather than acting as a source for the rethinking of 
existing governance rationalities in any new way.  
 
Turin: the crisis, here it is again 
Turin, in the north-west of Italy, used to be known as a paradigmatic one-company town due 
to the location of  FIAT (its acronym stands for Fiat Automobili Italia Torino), one of the main 
carmakers in Western Europe. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the city suffered a deep 
deindustrialisation process which ended the primacy of the industrial sector and led to a shift 
towards a more service-oriented economy. In the late 1990s, the nomination of the city to host 
the 2006 :LQWHU 2O\PSLF *DPHV UDGLFDOO\ FKDQJHG WKH FLW\¶V LPDJH ZKLFK VWDUWHG EHLQJ
SRUWUD\HGDVDµFUHDWLYHFLW\¶VWURQJO\FRPPLWWHGWRFXOWXUH-led regeneration (Vanolo, 2008). 
In this context, Turin played a pioneering role in strategic planning in Italy (Pinson, 2002), 
being frequently compared to conventional models of entrepreneurial urbanism in Europe, such 
as Barcelona and Manchester.  
In Turin, the Winter Olympic Games in 2006 were considered a successful event, leading to a 
renewed sense of civic pride and the city being held as a role model in both economic and 
governance terms in Italy (Emmott, 2012). However, already in 2010 the city government 
disclosed a high public debt, the highest per capita in Italy. 2QO\RQH\HDUODWHULQ,WDO\¶V
government attracted the attention of the European Central Bank due to its high debt-to-GDP 
ratio, inducing prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to resign. Since then, international news media 
started associating Italy with the so-called PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain), 
comprising the financially troubled economies in the European Union (Faiola and Schneider, 
 ,WDO\¶V PRGHO RI µFRQFHUWHG QHROLEHUDOLVP¶ 5RVVL  EDVHd on the active 
involvement of the organisations representing workers and employers in the enactment of 
market-oriented reform proposals, thus entered a crisis of legitimation. The ensuing local 
austerity measures together with the global economic slump heavily  impacted on the labour 
market: the unemployment rate rose from 5, 6% in 2008 to 12.9 in 2014, amongst the highest 
in the North of Italy. In this context, the manufacturing sector, which had constantly shrunk for 
a decade, lost 15,000 jobs between 2008 and 2009, then regaining only a few hundred jobs in 
the following two years (Istat, annual reports). The other main sectors have been more resilient 
to the crisis with the public sector retaining its employment share and retail slowing down after 
a massive increase between 2001 and 2008.  
In Turin, this crisis has been perceived as a déjà vu of the crisis experienced in the 1980s, when 
the city got traumatized by the loss of about 130 thousand jobs in the automotive sector, 
dissolving its identity as a solid company town attracting domestic migrants from all across the 
country in post-war Italy. This sense of repetition has been reinforced by an even stronger sense 
of lost hope: the illusion brought on by the designation in 1999 as Olympic city symbolising a 
successful transition to a post-Fordist city investing in cultural and sports events and related 
urban transformation projects. Existing problems of social deprivation were dampened in 
public to conform to the image of a re-invented successful city; WKHFLW\¶VHFRQRPLFUHQDLVVDQFH
was inflated. As an executive of a large bank foundation with headquarters in Turin put it to 
XV³UHFHQWO\WKHPDVVPHGLDJRWVRLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHHFRQRPLFFULVLVLQ7XULQEHFDXVH7XULQLV
VHHQDVWKHµIDOOHQJLDQW¶´7KHUHfore, the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2010 budgetary 
crisis not only affected negatively the lives of residents in Turin but also deeply affected their 
identity as a post-Fordist city.  
The chairman of the local branch of Union Camere (Chamber of commerce) told us in an 
interview that this repetitive sense of the crisis meant that: 
³$WWKHEHJLQQLQJZHSHUFHLYHGWKHFULVLVOHVVEHFDXVH7XULQLVPRUHDFFXVWRPHGWRD
condition of crisis. Despite diversification efforts, our economy is still centred on the 
manufacturing sector and particularly the automotive industry, which has suffered a lot 
from the crisis, while small and medium-sized firms are weaker here compared with 
other DUHDVLQRXU3LHGPRQWUHJLRQ´ 
The shock originally associated with the diVFORVXUHRIORFDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQGHEWHGQHVVLQ
RYHUODSSHG ZLWK ,WDO\¶V VRYHUHLJQ GHEW FULVLV DQG WKH LQLWLDWLRQ RI DQ DXVWHULW\ SURJUDPPH
imposed by the European Central Bank. In this context, the local government started adopting 
measures aimed at debt relief, such as the partial privatisation of public utilities, although some 
of these never materialised. Only at this time, there was the perception of the city being hit by 
a major economic downturn.  
$WWKHSROLF\OHYHO7XULQ¶VSROLWLFR-economic elites have reacted to the economic downturn 
VHHNLQJWRUHYLYHWKHFLW\¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDODSSURDFKWRXUEDQJRYHUQDQFH7KHWKLUGVWUDWHJLF
SODQQLQJSURFHVVIRUWKHFLW\HQWLWOHGµ7RULQRPHWURSROL¶ZDVSUHVHQWHGLQ$VVLPSO\
put by the coordinator RIWKLVSODQLQDQLQWHUYLHZIRUWKLVUHVHDUFK³WKLVSODQKDVEHHQOLWHUDOO\
founded on the crisis, as this is a plaQZLWKRXWIXQGLQJ´. While building on the same economic 
rationale of the previous two plans, the idea of Turin as a knowledge-based economy, this plan 
has gone almost unnoticed by the general public (unlike the previous two), which has appeared 
LQFUHDVLQJO\GLVHQFKDQWHGZLWKWKHSROLWLFDOSURFHVV&ULWLFDOYLHZVKROGWKDWWKHFLW\¶VHFRQRP\
is stuck not only because of the global economic crisis, but also because of a self-reproducing, 
elitist politico-economic system (the so-FDOOHG µ6LVWHPD 7RULQR¶ ZLWKLQ WKH ZLGHU µ6LVWHPD
,WDOLD¶ GRPLQDWHG E\ XQDFFRXQWDEOH SDUW\ EXUHDXFUDFLHV DQG LQWHUHVW JURXSV 3DJOLDVVRWWL
2014). This perception of elitist urban government, and the combined effects of the austerity 
measures, has led to a widespread sense of political disillusionment and social resentment. 
Social contestation peaked in December 2013, when an apparently self-organised multitude of 
temporary workers, street vendors, impoverished retailers and unemployed young people took 
to the streets and grounded the city to a halt for three days, giving rise to riots in the historic 
centre. Since then, in the national mass media Turin has been increasingly presented as an 
example of the prolonged recession affecting the Italian economy and society, especially in 
relation to the restructuring of its manufacturing and retail trade sectors. The political 
disenfranchisement with the local elites and the effects of the crisis led to a turning point in the 
FLW\¶VSROLWLFDOWUDMHFWRU\LQ0D\ZKHQWKHFDQGLGDWHRIWKHFLWL]HQ-led, populist, 5-Star 
0RYHPHQWSDUW\VXUSULVLQJO\ZRQRYHUWKHH[LVWLQJPD\RUVXSSRUWHGE\,WDO\¶VFXUUHQWO\UXOLQJ
party. The electoral political geography show a divided city with low income and middle class 
neighbourhoods voting for Five-star, while the more affluent central areas choosing the centre-
left candidate.   
Local political leaders have expressed an ambivalent attitude towards the urban dimension of 
WKHUHFHQWFULVLV2QWKHRQHKDQGWKH\DFNQRZOHGJHLWVVWURQJLPSDFWRQ7XULQ¶VHFRQRP\LQ
terms of unemployment and social exclusion. On the other hand, political leaders refuse the 
dramatization of the crisis in Turin offered by the mass media, particularly in light of the civil 
unrest of December 2013. The former mayor of Turin for example in our interview said to us 
that ³9LD$PHQGROD>WKHVWUHHWLQWKHFLW\FHQWUHZKHUHPDQ\VKRSVFORVHGDWWUDFWLQJPHGLD
attention in 2012] is quite a unique case and cannot be generalized in the way media have been 
GRLQJODWHO\,GRQ¶WVHHWKLVMRXUQDOLVPDVVHULRXV´$SULO,QFRQFOXVLRQLQ7XULQWKH
crisis is seen as an intricate phenomenon, multi-scalar and multi-temporal, resulting at one and 
the same time from the global and supranational contexts, but also from internal weaknesses, 
VXFKDV WKHXQILQLVKHGGHLQGXVWULDOLVDWLRQSURFHVVRI WKH)RUGLVW WLPHVDQG WKH µPHJD-event 
EXEEOH¶DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWinter Olympics of 2006. 
 
A crisis compared: variegated narrations, same old solutions 
Our comparative analysis has taken us in a journey to locate the 2008 global financial crisis in 
four different areas of Europe: North: Leeds; centre: Brussels; South: Barcelona and Turin. We 
looked at how local actors interpreted the global financial crisis in terms of its geographical 
trajectory and timing and how the crisis became local ± what did it mean for that particular city 
at that particular time and, how the impacts and interpretations of the crisis shaped emerging 
policy responses. This comparative analysis allows us to make a wider contribution to study of 
variegated urban neoliberalisation processes. 
In terms of the timing of the crisis, we find significant differences. In Leeds, the crisis was felt 
strongly very early on with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and there was 
agitation amongst local elites. By 2011, with the national austerity package, the crisis lost 
significance at the local level as it became a national issue,Q7XULQWKHFULVLVEHFDPHµORFDO¶ 
when the deficit of the municipality was made public in 2010 and aggravated by the ,WDO\¶V
government debt crisis from 2011 and local street protests in 2013. In Barcelona, early on, the 
city proclaimed itself as a model for finding local solutions to the global and national crisis, 
but from 2011, citizen contestation was making clear that the city was going through very 
difficult moments. In Brussels it is difficult to pinpoint a specific moment as the global 
financial crisis was absorbed by long term and ongoing local/regional governance and 
budgetary crisis. Therefore, particularly in the eaUO\VWDJHV WKHFULVLVGLGQRWµDUULYH¶ to our 
cities at the same time, it was not felt as one synchronised global event. 
In terms of the geographical trajectory of the crisis, each city also interpreted this slightly 
differently although most local elites agreed that the crisis was arriving from elsewhere. In 
Barcelona, the local elites distanced themselves from the origins of the crisis which was 
attributed to the national and international scales. Similarly in Leeds, it was linked to the US 
subprime mortgage market crisis and the banking credit crunch and later on to the national 
government. In Brussels the crisis was associated with the complicated national and regional 
governance arrangements. In Turin the global crisis intermeshed with local and national 
factors: the municipal budgetary crisis which was seen as a failure of the post-industrial 
strategy of the 2006 Olympic Games EXWDOVRDVDQHIIHFWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VZLGHUGHEWFULVLV.  
Therefore we see that there has been a significant variation in how local actors narrated the  
global financial crisis in terms of both impact and response, particularly in relation to its 
timings and geographical trajectories. Previous experiences of urban crisis also had a strong 
influence in how each city reacted. In Turin, the city had developed an identity based around 
its renaissance after the deep 1970s crisis which made it difficult for the local elites to fully 
accept the latest crisis. In Brussels it was more a case of the city having gone through a period 
of multiple almost chronic crisis at various scales (local, regional, national) which made the 
local decision makers miss the 2008 global crisis as a particularly relevant event for them. 
Therefore the previous experience of crisis, constrained and shaped the meaning making 
process to interpret the  the most current crisis would be received.  
Finally, in terms of policy responses, austerity measures are constraining even more local 
authorities in their functions and forcing them to privatise or co-GHOLYHUVHUYLFHV³$XVWHULW\
XUEDQLVP´3HFNLVEHLQJMXVWLILHGDQGGHDOWZLWKLQVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWIRUPV,Q/HHGV
the emphasis is for tKHORFDODXWKRULW\WREHFRPHDµFLYLFHQWUHSUHQHXU¶, a facilitator of private 
inveVWPHQW,Q7XULQDQG%DUFHORQDµVPDUWFLW\¶ has become the new slogan which is easily 
combined with a leaner and more efficient local authority on a reduced budget. In the four cities 
we have seen a strengthening of the city-regional scale shifting more responsibilities to non-
accountable and private-led governance bodies. Still, it is too early to say whether the new local 
governments in Turin and Barcelona, which have emerged out of contestation to the crisis, will 
throw out something new, although at least for the case of Spain the constraints of the previous 
model and the austerity frame are proving a big challenge (Martí-Costa and Subirats, 2016) 
What we have learnt from this comparative analysis is that there is great variation in the way 
in which the glREDOILQDQFLDOFULVLVZDVPDGHµORFDO¶, particularly in its timing and geographical 
trajectory and how local actors interpreted the significance of it. This chimes ZLWK-HVVRS¶V
 SRLQW WKDW ³those affected by crisis typically disagree on their objective and 
subjective aspects because they start from different entry points, standpoints, and capacities to 
UHDG WKH FULVLV´ There is however less variation between the cities in terms of the policy 
responses and initiatives that have emerged from the crisis and we do not see any significant 
rethinking of the previous local economic development strategies. We can explain this potential 
paradox in various ways. Firstly, it seems clear from our case study evidence that the crisis has 
not been seized as an opportunity to question the pre-crisis model of urban economic 
development. Local actors did not think this was a crisis of or in their own growth models; 
none of the local politico-economic elites seem to have made a connection publically between 
the real-estate, financialised and mega-event fuelled urban growth of the early 2000s 
particularly in Turin, Barcelona and Leeds with the sub-prime mortgage and financial crisis of 
the 2007-8. It was the social movements from the 2011 that emerged globally and that had 
special prominence in Barcelona that made this direct connection. Therefore we do not find 
that the crisis has significantly altered the neoliberal rationalities that informed pre-crisis urban 
governance. Secondly, this local experiences are resonating with the chatter at the national and 
international policy creation and circulation circles, where the same best practices and policy 
recipes that had become prominent in the last decades are still valid although with less budget 
(Oosterlynck and Gonzalez, 2013). Thus narratives such as the Smart or the Resilient City or 
the Civic Entrepreneur, which we have seen in our case studies, are particularly appropriate 
because they combine a sense of something new but with less public resources attached. 
In the beginning of this contribution we argued that a Cultural Political Economy approach 
suggests that crisis can be opening moments for contestation and questioning of established 
imaginaries and thus critical moments for the study of variegation. In Turin and Barcelona we 
KDYHVHHQIRUPVRISXEOLFFRQWHVWDWLRQDQGTXHVWLRQLQJ OHDGLQJWRVRPH³UHSROLWLVDWLRQRI
VHGLPHQWHG GLVFRXUVHV DQG SUDFWLFHV´ DV SXW LW E\ -HVVRS (2015). In Turin, the post-Fordist 
renaissance was put in question and in Barcelona the µ%DUFHORQD0RGHO¶ was openly criticised. 
However this (re)politicisation has not been enough to change established governmental 
rationalities. Fuller and West (2016), in their study of the lack of contestation of the austerity 
GLVFRXUVHLQWKH8.H[SODLQWKDWFULWLTXHGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\HPHUJHIURPFULVLV³&ULVLVWDON´
by powerful actors, they argue, might not give rise to a new social order because they manage 
the VLWXDWLRQWRVXSUHVVFRQWHVWDWLRQDQGPDLQWDLQWKHVRFLDORUGHU³&ULVLVWDON´FDQLQIDFWVHUYH
WRGLVSODFH FRQWHVWDWLRQDQG WKHPRUH VRFLDOO\ MXVWLFH DOWHUQDWLYHV WR WKH³FXUUHQWQHROLEHUDO
RUGHU´EHFDXVHFLWL]HQVDUHSUHVHQWHGZLWKWKHDOWHUQDWLYHRIDmuch worse situation if public 
VSHQGLQJFXWVDUHQRWPDGH/RFDODFWRUVDOOXGHWRD³PDFUR-HFRQRPLFLQHYLWDELOLW\´)XOOHU
and West, 2016: 9) to justify their actions, something we have seen at work in our case studies. 
7KLVUHVRQDWHVZLWK-HVVRS¶VDUJXPHnt of the role of dominant social forces trying to stabilize 
FDSLWDO¶VFRQWUDGLFWLRQVDQGFULVLVby prioritising some contradictions more than others (Jessop, 
2014). In our case studies we show the role of the local actors in channelling and translating 
the significance of the global financial crisis as something external, not threatening the 
foundations of the local economic development trajectories and therefore themselves. 
Therefore, crisis moments can create openings for contestation and questioning but this does 
not necessarily lead to radical changes as long as the same or similar configuration of powerful 
actors remain in place. However, despite this lack of radical changes, we have shown the 
importance of the local scale as an important arena for the study of variegation thus contributing 
to ongoing discussions about the need to spatialise further the uneven development of 
capitalism (Peck and Theodore, 2007) 
 
Conclusions 
Crisis moments are a particular  fertile territory for the analysis of variegation and the ways in 
which processes of neoliberalism might be deepened, contested, re-oriented or transformed. In 
this paper we aimed to explore both how variegation is produced and the potential windows 
for alternative futures paying special attention to governmental rationalities . We have done so 
by questioning the conventional deterritorialized lens at which we are accustomed to look at 
the global crisis. In contrast, we have held a twofold perspective: a focus on the local scale ± 
within broader and complex urban geographies ± and a comparative analysis. This double view 
has allowed us to learn about wide processes (such as the global financial crisis) from looking 
FRPSDUDWLYHO\ LQ GHSWK DW YDULRXV FLWLHV FRQILUPLQJ 5RELQVRQ¶V SRLQW WKDW ³H[SHULHQFHV LQ
GLIIHUHQW SODFHV FRXOG VKDSH DQG WUDQVIRUP FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQV RI WKHVH ZLGHU SURFHVVHV´
(2016:13). 
In a nutshell we have found that the global financial crisis from the 2007/8 initially impacted 
our four cities in very different ways. One important finding from our research is that the global 
financial crisis unfolded not as one single event, like an explosion radiating outwards in a 
unidirectional trajectory but as series of events, sometimes loosely connected, with a 
geographically diverse topography. It was experienced very differently according to the place 
where you look at it from, from its timing and phases, to its impact. The global financial crisis 
did not always dominate the economic imaginaries of local actors but it temporarily acquired 
prominence when it resonated with locally relevant events. As this crisis turned into austerity 
measures the experience has become more homogeneous. Thus we are faced with the 
deepening of uneven development of capitalism in Europe, and therefore, of its crisis impacts 
on the one hanGDQG WKHLQFUHDVLQJVLPLODUµORFDO¶ responses framed in structural trends of 
austerity at national and European scale and few urban discourses increasingly produced 
globally (e.g. Smart Cities), on the other. Ironically, these solutions or policy ideas that 
emerged out from the crisis are not very different to pre-crisis times and also do not differ 
substantially between cities. The global financial crisis has not led to a questioning of the pre-
crisis entrepreneurial forms of urban governance; most cities saw the crisis as an external and 
global process. In fact austerity measures are furthering market-led mechanisms within local 
authorities although we still need to see how µFLWL]HQ-OHG¶ governments in Turin and Barcelona 
will behave. There was therefore a variegation in how the crisis ZDVµPDGHORFDO¶, in how its 
significance was interpreted and its impact on local economic imaginaries across our four 
cities. We find however a lot less variegation in how new imaginaries out of the crisis were 
constructed; there seems to be a re-adaptation and retrofitting of pre-crisis policy recipes.  
Through our comparative analysis of the variegated urbanisation of the global financial crisis 
we have been able to investigate how existing governmental rationalities have navigated 
through the global economic crisis and its prolonged aftermath in different national and geo-
economic contexts. We have seen the importance of powerful local actors in interpreting and 
narrating the place of their cities in the world. We have emphasised the role of the economic 
imaginaries that have been built in each city through a historical trajectory which shapes and 
conditions the range of options available to local actors to interpret the crisis. This is an 
important contribution to the influential work on variegated neoliberalisation processes by 
Brenner et al (2009) which has tended to overlook the role of specific actors and established 
governmental rationalities at the local scale and pays less attention to the processes of meaning-
making that particular agents engage into. Instead, our Cultural Political Economy approach 
combined with a comparative perspective, has shown the important role of local agents in the 
variegation process. We have also show the importance of contextualising local arenas within 
national path dependent trajectories as well as supra-national (such as European Union policies 
and regulatory frameworks) and the resilience of neoliberal reason at the global level. In doing 
so, our comparative analysis of the discursive framing of the crisis has showed how mainstream 
politico-economic elites dealing with global economic crisis have tended to justify the 
reproduction of pre-crisis politico-HFRQRPLF SDWWHUQV /HHGV¶ PRELOL]DWLRQ of the notion of 
UHVLOLHQFH DV D ZD\ WR SURWUDFW LWV HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW PRGHO %UXVVHOV¶ UHIXVH WR
DFNQRZOHGJHWKHUHOHYDQFHLWVHOIRIWKHHFRQRPLFFULVLV%DUFHORQD¶VOD\LQJWKHEODPHRQWKH
QDWLRQDOVWDWHIRUEHLQJUHVSRQVLEOHRIWKHFULVLV7XULQ¶VSHrception of the crisis as a déjà vu 
denying the very possibility of a radical change. These can be all interpreted as discursive 
WDFWLFV HPDQDWLQJ IURP WKH µSROLWLFDO XQFRQVFLRXV¶ -DPHVRQRIXUEDQQHROLEHUDOLVP
more or less deliberately aimed at reasserting the power of hegemonic blocs and coalitions as 
well as of socially accepted styles of government and modes of administering the economy. 
However, despite these efforts by powerful actors to seek stability new contradictions are 
constantly emerging: the deepening of the crisis of European political and financial project, 
likely to affect citizens in all our case study cities; but also new waves of social resentment 
undermining the legitimacy of existing elites and giving rise to different forms of political 
turmoil, at both national and local levels, as recent municipal elections in Barcelona and Turin 
DVZHOODVWKHµ%UH[LW¶YRWHLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP have showed. All of these conflicts offer 
illustrative evidence of the highly contradictory character of the present post-recession 
transition and the central role cities are playing in it.  
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i
 In fact, the OECD Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) met in Barcelona 
in March 2009. The gathering of local economic leaders from across the world proclaimed 
Barcelona as a post-crisis model; indeed the gathering agreed on the so-FDOOHG ³%Drcelona 
3ULQFLSOHV´DVVROXWLRQVWRWKHFULVLVLQFLWLHV2RVWHUO\QFNDQG*RQ]DOH] 
ii
 PEMB was founded by Barcelona City Council and Metropolitan Authority, Airport, Port 
Free Trade Zone and Fair Authorities, chamber of commerce, Fomento (Business Association, 
WZR XQLRQV DQG &tUFXOR GH (FRQRPLD HOLWH¶V DVVRFLDWLRQ ,Q LWV &RXQFLO %RDUG WKHUH DUH
represented 300 persons and institutions from Universities, business associations to cultural 
ones or the Archbishop of Barcelona. Pacte industrial gathers together 51 city councils, 
regional, provincial and metropolitan authorities, eleven business associations, two unions and 
22 economic and cultural institutions. 
iii
 Though with different normative emphasis, this was confirmed by interviews with the Head 
oI 0D\RU¶V &DELQHW WKH SUHVLGHQW RI WKH )HGHUDWLRQ RI 1HLJERKRRG $VVRFLDWLRQV DQG $EHO
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Albet academic at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (see also March and Ribera-Fumaz, 
2016). 
iv
 Indeed, During the nationalist rigth-wing mayor period (2011-2015), besides the support of the local 
council to the pro-independence regional government, there was only one document staging the role of 
Barcelona within an independent Catalonia (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2014). The book, a rather odd 
compilation of short texts by prominent Barcelona figures was prepared in a short period of time (three 
months) and right after the presentation in November 2014 it disappear from public debates about the 
city. 
v
 This is confirmed by a quick-scan of the main Dutch newspaper (weekly published) for 
%UXVVHOVZKHUHWKHVHDUFKWHUPµHFRQRPLVFKHFULVLV¶RQO\GHOLYHUVIRXUWHHQUHOHYDQWDUWLFOHV
between 2007 and 2015 (see: www.bruzz.be). 
vi
 A search in the electronic database with reports of the debates in the BCR parliament between 
DQGXVLQJWKHWHUPµFULVLV¶RQO\OHGWRWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIQLQHVHVVLRQVZKHUHRQH
or more questions on the impact of the financial-economic crisis on Brussels were asked. See: 
http://www.weblex.irisnet.be/bhr/ questframe.asp.  
vii
 This asylum seekers crisis refers to the upsurge in requests for support in the public welfare 
centre of the municipality of Brussels, due to the failure of the responsible federal agency 
Fedasil to provide shelter for new refugees.  
viii
 In 2008, Gemeentelijke Holding held 17% of the shares in Dexia (Brussels Hoofdstedelijk 
Gewest Integraal verslag, Commissie voor de Financiën, zitting 24 Oktober 2011. 
ix
 Calculated on the basis of the data provided by Observatorium voor Gezondheid en Welzijn 
Brussel-Hoofdstad, see  
www.observatbru.be/documents/indicateurs/pauvrete/04_nl_gemiddeld-en-mediaan-netto-
belastbaar-inkomen-in-per-jaar-brussels-gewest-en-
gemeenten.xls+&cd=10&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=be [last accessed on 19/12/2016] 
